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Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing
Qualified Privilege for Newsmen
By JAMES C. GOODALE*
AFTER Senator Sam 3. Ervin, Jr. had spent two months presiding
over hearings on Senate bills to create a testimonial privilege for news-
men, he commented that he had never dealt with any more difficult
issue in the years he had been in Congress.'
The issuance of subpoenas to newsmen raises many questions, and
it would be foolish for any author of an article to assume that he could
answer them all. Indeed, if there is any solution to the problems pre-
sented by subpoenas, it is to let them be resolved on a case-by-case
basis so that, in effect, a common law of subpoenas may develop. In
time, this evolutionary process of the law may assist us in answering
these questions.
Perhaps this is what Justice Powell had in mind when he wrote
in his concurring opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes:2
The asserted claim to [a newsman's] privilege should be judged
on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom
of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testi-
'mony with respect -to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital
constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis- accords
with the tried and -traditional way of adjudicating such questions.3
I say "perhaps" because Justice Powell's opinion is singularly opaque,
albeit the key to the five to four decision in the Branzburg case. This
article will dissect that case, and particularly Justice Powell's concurring
opinion, in an effort to articulate the qualified newsman's privilege ac-
tually favored by a numerical majority of the Court. An analysis of
post-Branzburg decisional law will follow, illustrative of the growing
* Executive Vice President, The New York Times. Member, New York Bar.
Mr. Goodale was counsel for The New York Times in United States v. Caldwell.
1. Hearings on S. 36 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 387 (1973).
2. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
3. Id. at 710 (Powell, I., concurring).
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body of cases from which the Court will be able to draw when it is
confronted again with the qualified privilege issue.
Branzburg v. Hayes
The Branzburg Cases
Branzburg v. Hayes arose out of two stories written by Paul Branz-
burg, a reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal. The first was
about the making of hashish, illustrated with a picture of the hands of
a person doing so. The second story discussed the use of drugs in
Frankfort, Kentucky, and described numerous conversations with un-
named drug users.
On the basis of the stories, Branzburg was subpoenaed by two
separate grand juries. In the first case, he refused to say who he had
seen making the hashish. Ruling on Branzburg's appeal of a lower
court order that he answer the grand jury's questions, the Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky held 4 that the state statute 5 which protects newsmen
from having to reveal sources does not protect persons who witness the
commission of crimes.6 The court therefore required Branzburg to
testify.
In the second case, Branzburg refused both to disclose the names
of those persons who had told him drugs were being used in Frankfort,
and to reveal other information given to him in confidence. The lower
court granted Branzburg a protective order so that he would not have
to testify as to his sources, but required him to appear to claim the pri-
vilege. Branzburg had argued that he had a First Amendment pnvi-
lege not to appear at all before the grand jury, since once he went into
the grand jury room there was no way for his sources to know whether
or not he was testifying as to confidential information. Contempt pro-
ceedings were brought, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals denied a
petition for prohibition and order that the subpoena be quashed.
7
4. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
5. "421.100. Newspaper, radio or television broadcasting station personnel need
not disclose source of information..
"No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial before
any court, or before any grand or petit jury, or before the presiding officer of any tri-
bunal, or his agent or agents, or before the general assembly, or any committee thereof,
or before any city or county legislative body, or any committee thereof, or elsewhere,
the source of any information procured or obtained by him, and published in a news-
paper or by a radio or television broadcasting station by which he is engaged or em-
ployed, or with which he is connected." KY. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1969).
6. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 347-48 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
7. Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971).
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Branzburg sought review of both cases in the United States Supreme
Court.
Succinctly, then, the issue raised in the first case (Branzburg 1)
was whether a reporter who had witnessed a crime could, under the
First Amendment, be required to testify before a grand jury as to what
he had seen. The issue in the second case (Branzburg II) was
whether a reporter could be required to appear before a grand jury
in order to claim a privilege against such testimony.
The Caldwell Case
Branzburg II raised the same question as Caldwell v. United
States,8 which was consolidated with it for decision by ,the Supreme
Court. Earl Caldwell was a black reporter who had been assigned by
The New York Times to cover the activities of the Blank Panthers on
the West Coast. He had been sent to take the place of a white reporter
who had been unable to develop an appropriate relationship with the
Black Panthers. Caidwell had interviewed Black Panthers at their
headquarters and had written sixteen articles about them during 1969. 9
One of his interviews was with David Hilliard, a Black Panther leader,
whom Caldwell described as having said that he wished to kill President
Nixon.
Caldwell was first served with a subpoena duces tecum by the
grand jury which asked him to bring with him to the grand jury hearing
all of his notes and recordings relating to his interviews and conversa-
tions with the Black Panthers. 10 After Caldwell and The New York
Times objected to the scope of the subpoena, the government withdrew
it and substituted a second one, which required Caldwell to appear be-
fore the grand jury and to testify as to his conversations with the Black
Panthers."
8. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972).
9. Brief for Respondent Caldwell at 4, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972).
10. Caldwell suspected that the conversations at the Black Panther's headquarters
had been wiretapped. He argued at both the district court and court of appeals for a
hearing under Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). See Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas at 29-30,
Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal.), rev'd in part sub nom., Caldwell
v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom., Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972); Brief for Appellant Caldwell at 69, Caldwell v. United States, 434
F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
11. Brief for Respondent Caldwell 4t 7, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972),
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Caldwell moved to quash the second subpoena and sought a pro-
tective order allowing him to shield the identity of his sources. He
argued that newsmen are entitled to a qualified privilege not to dis-
close sources and other information unless there is a showing of a com-
pelling state interest in their testimony. This showing, he said, could
be made if (1) the information sought was demonstrably relevant to
a clearly-defined legitimate subject of governmental inquiry; (2) it af-
firmatively appeared that the inquiry was likely to turn up material in-
formation; and (3) the information sought was unobtainable by means
less destructive of First Amendment freedoms. 2 Implicit in his choice
of a motion to quash the subpoena, rather than merely one to modify
it, was Caldwell's position that he was constitutionally protected from
appearing at all, for the same reasons that Branzburg had urged before
the Kentucky Court.'3
The district court granted Caldwell's motion for a protective order,
holding:
[H]e need not reveal confidential associations that impinge upon
the effective exercise of his First Amendment right to gather news
• . . until such time as a compelling and overriding national inter-
est which cannot be alternatively served has been established to the
satisfaction of the Court.14
The court ruled, however, that Caldwell had to appear before the grand
jury.' 5 Rather than appear, Caldwell appealed the district court's deci-
sion. His appeal was dismissed, apparently on the ground that the or-
der was not appealable. He was then held in contempt by the district
court.1 6
12. Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 19-32, Application of Caldwell, 311
F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal.), rev'd in part sub nom., Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d
1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
13. "Because the grand jury sits behind closed doors," Caldwell's lawyer argued,
"his appearance there will itself cause irreparable injury to his relations with the Pan-
thers." Id. at 26.
14. Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 360 (N.D. Cal.), rev'd in part sub
nom., Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom., Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
15. 434 F.2d at 1080, citing Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919), and
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
16. 434 F.2d at 1083 n.2. After the appeal was dismissed, the term of the grand
jury expired. A new subpoena containing the same protective provisions was issued after
the new grand jury was sworn. The contempt order was a result of Caldwell's disregard
of the order directing attendance pursuant to this subpoena. Id. Compare Baker v. F
& F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), in which the court stated that "ordinarily,
orders denying or directing discovery are nonappealable interlocutory decisions . . ."
but permitted an appeal under "special circumstances" which "attend motions for dis-
covery made in a district other than the district in which the main action is brought."
Id. at 780 n.3. The Baker case is discussed more fully in the text accompanying notes
114-19 infra.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was no re-
quirement for Caldwell to appear before the grand jury if there was no
"compelling need" for such an appearance.1 7  The government filed
a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
There, the preceding cases were consolidated in In re Pappas.'
The Pappas Case
Paul Pappas, a reporter for a Providence, Rhode Island, television
station, had been inside a Black Panther headquarters at the time of
riots in New Bedford, Massachusetts. He had been invited in to wit-
ness what the Black Panthers thought would be a raid on the head-
quarters. He was subpoenaed by the Bristol County Grand Jury to tes-
tify as to what he had seen during his stay, although in fact there had
been no raid.19 Pappas testified before the grand jury as to what he
had seen outside the Panther headquarters, but not as to what he had
seen inside. He was subpoenaed a second time, but moved to quash
on the authority of the district court's opinion in Caldwell. This mo-
tion was denied, and the denial was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts.
2 0
The United States Supreme Court said that the Massachusetts
Supreme Court had characterized the record in Pappas as "meager,"21
and therefore concluded that the only issue presented was "whether
petitioner Pappas must appear before the grand jury to -testify pursuant
to subpoena."22 The Court went on to point out, "it is not clear what
petitioner will be asked by the grand jury."23  Technically, then, ap-
pearance was the only issue before the Court in Pappas, making it iden-
tical with Caldwell and Branzburg I. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
was presented with three cases raising the issue of appearance before
a grand jury and one raising the question of whether a reporter must
testify as to crimes he has witnessed.
The Proposed Qualified Privilege
Each of the reporters argued for a qualified privilege. Caldwell's
17. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub
nom., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
18. 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971).
19. Id. at 605, 266 N.E.2d at 298. It was not clear what information was
sought by the subpoena. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972).
20. In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971).




position was substantially the same as that he had asserted in the district
court-that before being required to appear there should be a showing
of compelling state interest, i.e., of relevance, materiality, and inability
to obtain the same information elsewhere.24 Pappas argued for
roughly the same position:
The State must demonstrate at the outset that it has reason to be-
lieVe from non-press sources that a crime has been committed, that
the newsman has information relevant to the crime, and that there
have been substantial but unsuccessful attempts to obtain this same
information elsewhere.
25
Branzburg's position was much tougher and was very similar to
the position The New York Times had taken in the Pentagon Papers
case. 6  Branzburg argued that the state has the heavy burden of prov-
ing that the testimony of the reporter is absolutely necessary to prevent
direct, immediate and irreparable prospective damage to the national
security, human life and liberty.
27
Professor Alexander Bickel of -the Yale Law School, representing
the three major television networks, The New York Times, and five
other amici, filed a brief supporting all three reporters. Bickel urged
a three-part test somewhat similar to that proposed by Caldwell but
much more difficult for the government to meet:
(1) The Government must clearly show there is probable cause to
believe that the reporter possesses information which is specifically
relevant to a specific probable violation of law. (2) The Govern-
ment must clearly show that the information it seeks cannot be ob-
tained by alternative means, which is to say, from sources other
than the reporter. (3) The Government must clearly demonstrate
a compelling and overriding interest in the information.
28
24. Caldwell's test proposed that for a compelling state interest to be present:
"(1) The 'information sought' must be demonstrably relevant to a clearly defined legiti-
mate subject of governmental inquiry ....
"(2) It must affirmatively appear that the inquiry is likely to turn up material in-
formation, that is: (a) that there is some factual basis for pursuing the investigation, and
(b) that there is reasonable ground to conclude that the particular witness subpoenaed
has information material to it....
"(3) The information sought must be unobtainable by means less destructive of
First Amendment freedoms." Brief for Respondent Caldwell at 82-84, Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
25. Brief for Petitioner Pappas at 46, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
26. See Brief for Petitioner The New York Times Co. at 58-63, New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), reprinted in 2 ThE NEw YoRK TIMES Com-
PANY v. UNrrED STATES, A DocuMENTARY HISTORY 1146-51 (J. Goodale ed. 1971).
27. Brief for Petitioner Branzburg at 44, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972).
28. Brief for The New York Times Co., National Broadcasting Co., Columbia
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The Branzburg Plurality Opinion
In his plurality opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes,29 Justice White
rejected the qualified privilege for newsmen and held that generally
newsmen must (1) appear before grand juries and (2) answer all rele-
vant questions during a criminal investigation. Accordingly-since he
refused to accept the compelling need standard adopted below on the
appearance issue-he reversed the Ninth Circuit decision in Caldwell,
and stated that Caldwell would have to appear before the grand jury.
The Court decided no other question in Caldwell, noting that "[o]ther
issues were urged upon us, but since they were not passed upon by the
Court of Appeals, we decline to address them in the first instance." 30
In Branzburg I, the Court required Branzburg to testify about the
crimes he had seen. In Branzburg II he was required to appear:
"[Branzburg] may be presumed to have observed . . . violations of
the state narcotics laws . . . ,3 1 If Branzburg had made such obser-
vations, Justice White would require him to testify to them; otherwise,
the sources would be protected by Kentucky law. In Pappas, the Court
also required appearance before the grand jury.
Stewart's Dissent and Powell's Concurring Opinion
While the plurality opinion rejected the qualified privilege, -three
of the dissenters-Justice Stewart, Justice Marshall, and Justice Bren-
nan-adopted it. In the words of Justice Stewart:
['Jhe government must (1) show that there is probable cause to
believe that the newsman has information -that is clearly relevant
to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that -the
information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less
destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a
compelling and overriding interest in 'the information.32
This, it may be noted, is almost a verbatim adoption of the test proposed
in Professor Bickers amicus brief. Justice Douglas, in his dissent,
stated that only an absolute privilege for reporters would satisfy the
First Amendment.33
Broadcasting System, Inc., American Broadcasting Co., Chicago Sun-Times, Chicago
Daily News, Associated Press Managing Editors Ass'n, Associated Press Broadcasters'
Ass'n and Association of American Publishers, Inc. as Amici Curiae at 29, Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
29. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
30. Id. at 708.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 743 (Stewart, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
33. Id. a~t 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting),
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The four plurality justices, then, seemingly rejected a qualified
privilege. Three dissenters were in favor of it, and Douglas voted with
them as most nearly representing his views. Thus, the key to the case
is Justice Powell's view. Justice Stewart called the Powell opinion
"enigmatic."3  It is opaque at best. Since it is, however, the key to
understanding Branzburg, an attempt must be made to penetrate it.
First, it is submitted that Justice Powell did adopt a qualified priv-
ilege for newsmen: "The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoe-
naed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights with
respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources." 35  It
follows that if reporters when subpoenaed to testify do have constitu-
tional rights as to gathering news and protecting their sources, then they
have a qualified privilege not to testify.
But the privilege will not apply to protect a reporter from appear-
ing, since Justice Powell points out that "[t]he newsman witness, like
all other witnesses, will have to appear; he will not be in a position
to litigate at the threshold the State's very authority to subpoena him. ''3 6
This determination disposes of Branzburg II, Pappas, and Caldwell, the
three cases dealing with appearance. It leaves one case for Justice
Powell to decide, Branzburg I-the witnessing of a crime.
Justice Powell would require Branzburg to testify as to criminal
behavior he had seen, or otherwise he would not have concurred with
the plurality opinion. Yet Justice Powell makes it clear that under cer-
tain circumstances, even when witnessing a crime is involved, he would
not force disclosure of sources. 7 Thus, putting aside the appearance
issue for the moment, what Branzburg v. Hayes decides is limited to
the fact pattern of Branzburg I, a witnessing of a crime by a newsman.
This narrow reading of the case is justified by the pains to which
34. Id. at 725.
35. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 710 n*. Powell does not say why the reporter should appear. White, in
the plurality opinion, notes that newsmen are not guaranteed by the First Amendment
special rights not granted other citizens, such as "a constitutional right of special access
to information not available to the public generally ....
"It is thus not surprising that the great weight of authority is that newsmen are
not exempt from the normal duty of appearing before a grand jury. . . ." Id. at 684-
85 (citations omitted). Powell does not explicate his reasons for joining the plurality
on the appearance issue and therefore may approve White's reasoning on this point.
Compare, however, Powell's dissent in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 94 S. Ct. 2811,
2815-27 (1974) (Powell, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
37. See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
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Justice Powell went in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.8 to point out that
his opinion in Branzburg was extremely limited:
I emphasized the limited nature of the Branzburg holding in my
concurring opinion: "The court does not hold that newsmen, sub-
poenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional
Tights with respect -to the gathering of news or the safeguarding of
their sources." In addition- to these explicit statements, a fair read-
ing of the majority's analysis in Branzburg makes plain that the re-
stit hinged on an assessment of the competing societal interests in-
volved in that case rather than on any determination that First
Amendment freedoms were not implicated.3 9
If Justice Powell, then, adopts a qualified privilege for newsmen,
what are its limits? This is, of course, -the heart of the enigma. It is
conceivable that Justice Powell has not yet determined the matter for
himself, and would prefer to have more case law develop before he
articulates precisely what he has in mind.4" But does he rejeot entirely
the three-part test suggested by Justice Stewart which, simply stated,
demands (a) relevance, (b) exhaustion of alternate sources, and (c)
compelling national interest in the testimony?
It is quite clear that he accepts the relevance test, since he would
quash the subpoena if "the newsman is called upon to give information
bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the
investigation .... ,,41 The requirement of establishing more than a
remote and tenuous relationship, it would seem, is no more than a re-
quirement to show relevance.
Justice Powel's views on -the other two parts of the test are not
clear. He stated -that Stewart's proposal "would impose . . . heavy
burdens of proof to be carried by the State."'42 Whether Justice Powell
was stating that the remainder of the test should fall because it is bur-
densome, or merely that the burden of proof is improperly placed and
should be shifted from the state to the newsman, is unclear. A reason-
able argument can be made that all that Powell intended was the shift-
ing of the burden. If this is so, then the remaining two tests may
survive, although the onus probandi is altered.
Dealing first with the requirement of compelling state interest, it
38. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 94 S. Ct. 2811 (1974).
39. Id. at 2819-20 (citations omitted) (Powell, Brennan & Marshall, JI., dissent-
ing).
40. "The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-
case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions."
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 710 n*.
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can be said that Justice Powell adopts the test to the extent that he
requires the state to seek only information required by a legitimate law
enforcement inquiry. In his words:
[N]o harassment of newsmen will be tolerated. . . . [I]f [the
newsman] has some other reason to believe -that his testimony im-
plicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate need
of law enforcement, he will have access to the court on a motion
to quash and an appropriate protective order may be entered.
4 3
It is submitted that this formulation is not unlike the dissenting minor-
ity's compelling state interest test. The Powell statement differs mainly
in requiring that the presence vel non of such an interest be demon-
strated by the newsman rather than 'by the government.
44
What of -the exhaustion of alternate sources test suggested by Jus-
tice Stewart, by Caldwell and by Bickel? Justice Powell is silent on
this point, and the most that can be said is that he does not explicitly
exclude exhaustion from the "balancing" he favors. However, the test,
which requires that the newsman be called to testify only as a last re-
sort, would seem to be a common sense way to accommodate First
Amendment interests with the interest of the state in seeking testimony.
And, as will be discussed below, many of the cases since Branzburg
have adopted -this exhaustion criterion.
The rule of a numerical majority of the justices in Branzburg v.
Hayes can therefore be said narrowly to be that reporters have a qual-
ified testimonial privilege, dependent on a showing by the newsman
that (a) the testimony would be irrelevant, (b) the testimony would
further no compelling state interest (e.g., when the testimony is sought
for purposes of harassment, not in good faith, or not for a legitimate
purpose of law enforcement), or (c) the testimony is not required by
other unspecified forms of balancing (e.g., exhaustion of alternate
sources).
43. Id. at 709-10.
44. This is of course different from the test for compelling state interest Bickel
proposed on behalf of the various amici, which would limit the subpoenaing of newsmen
to cases of serious crime. Compare Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Commit-
tee which in discussing compelling state interest stated: "We understand this to mean-
regardless of the label applied, be it 'nexus,' 'foundation,' or whatever-that it is an es-
sential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation which intrudes into the area of
constitutionally protected rights of speech, press, association and petition that the State
convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and subject of
overriding and compelling state interest. . . . 'Where there is a significant encroach-
ment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which is compelling'." 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963), quoting Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 524 (1959).
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Two ways to test the proposition that Branzburg actually does es-
tablish a qualified privilege comparable to that stated above are to as-
certain what would have happened to the three "appearance" cases on
remand, and to examine the relevant cases decided since Branzburg.
The Branzburg "Appearance" Trilogy on Remand
The first method must be speculative, since there was no further
testimony in any of the appearance cases. In Caldwell and Pappas the
grand juries were never reconvened to hear testimony (perhaps indicat-
ing that there never was any compelling interest in the newsmen's tes-
timony). Branzburg was held in contempt in absentia, since Michigan
would not extradite him -to Kentucky.45 Nevertheless, there is nothing
in the Branzburg opinion that would have prohibited either Caldwell
or Pappas from asserting on remand the privilege suggested by
Powell.40 The Court was very careful to point out that it did not have
the basic facts of either case before it. Thus, it is probable -that the
reporters would have been required to answer some questions and per-
mitted not to answer others, as was done in Bursey v. United States,47
a Ninth Circuit case that came down the day after Branzburg.
Ironically, then, it is not unreasonable to say that perhaps the re-
porters did gain a certain victory in Branzburg after all. If in fact Earl
Caldwell would have ended up testifying no differently under Powell's
rule than he would have through the application of his own -test-laying
the appearance issue aside-it is hard -to say he lost his case.
45. Personal communication with Paul M. Branzburg, August 1, 1974.
46. As noted, whether exhaustion of sources fits within whatever general balanc-
ing remains unparticularized by Powell is speculative. Presumably he would not require
such exhaustion in Branzburg I, since there is no such requirement in White's opinion,
in which he joins. In Branzburg I, however, there may be no alternate source since
the reporter alone apparently witnessed the making of hashish. On remand, then, in
Pappas and Caldwell, it may be said only that Powell might not require exhaustion of
alternate sources if the fact situations were analogous to Branzburg L As to other fact
situations, we do not know whether he would or would not require it. Thus, it would
not be proper to generalize from Powell's formulation in Branzburg to the proposition
that a reporter could be required to testify in every instance in which he was an eyewit-
ness to a crime, without there first being a showing of exhaustion of alternate sources.
47. 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972). See text accompanying notes 48-60 infra.
In fact, one of the reasons counsel for Caldwell decided to appeal the appearance
issue after winning a qualified privilege in the district court was an apprehension that
the government might possibly penetrate the privilege proposed there by Caldwell in
some unknown respect, forcing testimony, albeit of an extremely limited nature, from
Caldwell. Personal communication from Anthony Amsterdam, April 1971.
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The Cases Since Branzburg v. Hayes
As of mid-1974, there had been nearly two dozen newsmen's sub-
poena cases decided since Branzburg, and there will no doubt be more.
Many of the decisions appear confused and even wrong in their appli-
cation of Branzburg, which, as discussed above, actually ratifies a quali-
fied newsman's privilege. A majority of the cases have recognized that
such a privilege exists, but there is hardly unanimity on the point.
The following generalizations may be attempted:
(a) when courts are presented with the question of ,the witnessing
of a crime by a reporter, they usually require the reporter to testify;
(b) when presented with the question of possible criminal evi-
dence on a tape in a reporter's possession, they frequently require pro-
duction of the tape;
(c) in other criminal contexts, such as questions involving pretrial
publicity, several courts have not required testimony as to sources and
other information in the possession of a reporter;
(d) in civil cases generally there is reluctance to require reporters
to testify, although in libel cases testimony will be required if the court
believes there is a compelling interest in the testimony, that is, that it
"goes to the heart of the matter."
Each of these areas will be analyzed.
The Bursey Case and Witnessing Crimes
The day following the Branzburg decision, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals handed down its decision in Bursey v. United States.
48
Brenda Joyce Presley and Sherrie Bursey were reporters for the Black
Panther newspaper who were subpoenaed by a grand jury to be ques-
tioned about the paper, meetings of the Panthers, and David Hilliard's
speech threatening President Nixon, which had been reported in the
Black Panther.
They testified several times before the grand jury, answering some
questions (including whether they had any information about a plot to
kill the president) but refusing to answer inquiries relating -to informa-
tion received in confidence or relating to the management of the
paper.49 Following a motion by the grand jury to compel testimony,
the district court (the same court that decided Caldwell) granted a pro-
tective order which stated in part that Bursey and Presley should not
48. 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972).
49. The questions are listed in id. at 1068-71.
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be required to reveal confidential information received, developed or
maintained by them as professional journalists unless the government
showed a compelling and overriding national interest requiring their
testimony.50
After the granting of this order, the grand jury filed with the court
an affidavit from the Department of Justice which reprinted various
news articles containing revolutionary exhortations by Panther leaders,
including a New York Times article which quoted Billiard as saying,
"We advocate the very direct overthrow of the government by way of
force and violence." 51  The district court concluded that through this
affidavit the government had "established a compelling and overriding
national interest to which the conflicting constitutional rights of the re-
spondents must give way,"52 and required Bursey and Presley to answer
all questions.
There were fifty-six questions which Bursey and Presley refused
to answer. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit required that only seventeen
of the questions be answered, insofar as the government had not met
its burden of establishing, as to the remaining questions, "that its inter-
ests are legitimate and compelling and -that the incidental infringement
upon First Amendment rights is no greater than is essential to vindicate
its subordinating interests."53 The court went on to point out:
When the collision occurs in the context of a grand jury inves-
tigation, the Government's burden is not met unless it establishes
that the Government's interest in the subject matter of the inves-
tigation is "immediate, substantial, and subordinating," that there
is a "substantial connection" between the information it seeks to
have the witness compelled to supply and -the overriding govern-
mental interest in the subject matter of the investigation, and that
the means of obtaining information is not more drastic -than neces-
sary to forward the asserted governmental interest.54
Accordingly, Bursey and Presley did not have to answer generally ques-
tions seeking the identities of persons who edited or worked on the
paper or details of how it was edited. 55
50. In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573, 574 (N.D. Cal. 1970). This
order was in the same form as the one the district court had previously granted Caldwell.
51. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1068 (1972).
52. 322 F. Supp. at 578.
53. 466 F.2d at 1083, citing In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971), United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), De Gregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966),
and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
54. 466 F.2d at 1083.
55. See id. at 1087-88. Specifically, they did not have to answer questions seeking
to determine the person responsible for distributing the paper; the people who worked
on particular issues of the Black Panther; the jobs these people performed; the person
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On the other hand, they were required to answer questions con-
cerning whether they had seen any firearms and explosives in the pos-
session of the Black Panther Party, whether there had been any discus-
sion or meetings concerning their use, and whether there had been any
threats against the president at those meetings.56 Thus, on the petition
for rehearing the court distinguished between those questions regarding
direct witnessing of possible criminal activity and those relating to news-
gathering activities, even though the latter "might have something




Although 'the case was technically decided and released the day
following Branzburg, the opinion was probably written before it. Ac-
cordingly, the government promptly moved for a rehearing on the
ground that the Bursey holding was inconsistent with Branzburg. The
court denied this motion. It noted that Bursey, unlike Branzburg, did
not involve news-gathering or the question of appearance. The court
emphasized that -there was nothing in its holding to permit "a grand
jury witness to refuse on First Amendment grounds to identify a person
whom he has seen committing a crime. ",8 The court concluded:
We have reexamined our analysis of the factors involved in
balancing the First Amendment rights against the governmental in-
terests asserted to justify compelling answers to the questions here
involved, and we have concluded that the balance we struck is not
impaired by Branzburg.59
The court apparently applied the balancing test in this fashion:
(a) it found no compelling governmental need for the testimony of the
Panther reporters concerning their activities in publishing the paper,
even though their activities may have been related to the criminal con-
duct which the government had a legitimate and compelling interest
in investigating; and (b) it found no showing of the relevance of such
testimony, i.e., of a "'substantial connection' between the information
sought and the criminal conduct which the Government was investigat-
who did the layout work for the paper; the person who managed the distribution; the
persons who worked on the distribution staff; the persons who worked on the subscrip-
tion lists; the persons who decided what articles should be published; the person respon-
sible for putting pictures around an article about Eldridge Cleaver; the person distribut-
ing the newspaper in pamphlet form; and the names of certain persons whose pictures
appeared in a Life Magazine article about the Black Panthers. Compare id. at 1068-
70, with id. at 1087-88.
56. Id. at 1086 n.20.
57. Id. at 1090-91.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1091.
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ing. .... -60 Conversely, the court did find that these standards were
met by the questions concerning -the witnessing of criminal activity.
Additional Cases Involving Witnessing of Crimes
A few weeks following Bursey, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland also decided a case dealing with the witnessing of a crime,
Lightman v. State.61 David Lightman, a reporter for the Baltimore
Sun, 'had written a story not unlike Branzburg's based on -his observation
of the use of marijuana in an Ocean City, Maryland, pipe store.
Lightman argued that the Maryland statute covering sources62 pro-
tected him from disclosing -to a state grand jury the name of the person
who was using marijuana in the pipe shop.
The court disagreed, in an opinion -thereafter affirmed per curiam
by the Maryland Court of Appeals. It interpreted the word "source"
narrowly, as had the Kentucky Supreme Court in Branzburg I, so as
to exclude material taken out of the story. The court rejected the First
Amendment argument urged upon it, and disposed of the Supreme
Court's Branzburg decision in one sentence.63  It viewed its task as
merely one of interpreting the Maryland statute in -the same manner
as the Kentucky Supreme Court had in Branzburg I. Arguably, the
court should 'have considered balancing the constitutional interests in-
volved, particularly exhaustion of alternate sources. There was no
showing in the case that Lightman's testimony was sought as the last
resort; and, unlike Branzburg I, alternate sources of evidence should
have been available, since the pipe store was easily identifiable.
A third post-Branzburg case involving witnessing of crimes is Peo-
60. Id.; see id. at 1083 & 1086-88. In the court's articulation of the balancing test,
it deals with the alternate sources concept by noting that the means of obtaining the
information should not be more drastic than "necessary" to further the government's in-
terest. Id. at 1083. This test would not, apparently, require an exhaustion of alternate
sources, only a showing of necessity.
61. 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, affd per curiam, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212
(1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973).
62. "2. Employees on newspapers or for radio or television stations cannot be
compelled to disclose source of news or information.
"No person engaged in, connected with or employed on a newspaper or journal or
for any radio or television station shall be compelled to disclose, in any legal proceeding
or trial or before any committee of the legislature or elsewhere, the source of any news
or information procured or obtained by him for and published in the newspaper or dis-
seminated by the radio or television station on and in which he is engaged, connected
with or employed." MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1971).
63. '"That no such violation of the federal constitutional guarantees exists in such
circumstances has now been made clear by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Branzburg v. Hayes." 15 Md. App. at 726, 294 A.2d at 157.
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ple v. Dan.64 This case arose after two television newsmen, Stewart
Dan and Roland Barnes, were let into Attica prison during the riots
there in 1972 and apparently witnessed some of the killings which took
place. They were subpoenaed by a grand jury in upstate New York
to testify as to what they had seen. The newsmen argued that the New
York statute 65-which had been passed by the state legislature follow-
ing the district court's decision in the Caldwell case-protected them,
and that they had a constitutional privilege not to testify. The appellate
division held, however, that the statute protects only sources, and not
reporters who have been eyewitnesses to crimes.66 The court ruled
that there is no constitutional privilege, and declined to apply the bal-
ancing test.
Neither state court, it should be noted, was conceptually willing
to interpret its statute to protect information, other than sources, in the
possession of reporters.67 Such information is of the same genus as
"outtakes," the term used to describe that part of a television tape
which has been edited out before showing on the screen. 68  The term
64. 41 App. Div. 2d 687 (N.Y. 1973).
65. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1973) (added by L. 1970,
ch. 615, effective May 12, 1970), which states: "§ 79-h. Special provisions relating
to persons employed by, or connected with, news media.
"(a) Definitions. As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:
"(8) 'News' shall mean written, oral or pictorial information or communication
concerning local, national or worldwide events or other matters of public concern or
public interest or affecting the public welfare.
"(b) Exemption of professional journalists and newscasters from contempt.
"Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or specific law to the contrary, no
professional journalist or newscaster employed or otherwise associated with any news-
paper, magazine, news agency, press association, wire service, radio or television trans-
mission station or network, shall be adjudged in contempt by any court, the legislature
or other body having contempt powers, for refusing or failing to disclose any news or
the source of any such news coming into his possession in the course of gathering or
obtaining news for publication or to be published in a newspaper, magazine, or for
broadcast by a radio or television transmission station or network, by which he is profes-
sionally employed or otherwise associated in a news gathering capacity."
66. 41 App. Div. 2d 687, 688 (N.Y. 1973).
67. But cf. In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963) (holding that a statute
substantially the same as Maryland's and Kentucky's protected tapes of an interview with
a Philadelphia ward leader).
68. The term first came into wide public use when a House committee subpoenaed
Frank Stanton, president of the Columbia Broadcasting System, to produce outtakes of
"The Selling of The Pentagon." The committee wanted the outtakes to show that CBS
had been prejudiced in its selection of material for the documentary. Stanton stated to
the committee that he believed outtakes were protected by the First Amendment, and
that he was willing to be held in contempt of Congress for maintaining his position.
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is not limited to television tapes, however; it is applicable to any ma-
terial edited out of an account, either by an editor or by a reporter.
Thus, it is possible to fit within this category unedited proofs of stories,
contact prints of still photographs, and events which reporters see but
for a variety of reasons do not put in their stories-such as the identity
of the person making hashish in Branzburg's story, the identity of the
person using marijuana in Lightman's story, and the events seen by the
television men in People v. Dan.
Generally speaking, newsmen seek to protect outtakes, in the ge-
neric sense, to protect the integrity of the editing process. It is clear
that the First Amendment protects editing.69 Thus far, however, no
court since Branzburg has applied the balancing test to excuse reporters
from testifying as to the witnessing of a crime even though such infor-
mation has been taken out of their stories. 70 Bursey itself required
The House eventually killed the contempt move on a procedural vote. See N.Y. Times,
July 14, 1971, at 1, col. 8. See also N.Y. Times, July 2, 1971 at 1, col. 5.
69. "Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a compul-
sory access law and would not be forced to forego publication of news or opinion by
the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amend-
ment because of its intrusion into the function of editors. A newspaper is more than
a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising. The choice of ma-
terial to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size of
the paper, and content, and treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair
or unfair-constitutes the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised con-
sistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this
time." Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Tornillo, 94 S. Ct. 2831, 2839-40 (1974). See also
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124-25
(1973).
Nor does anything in Bursey require that a newsman's privilege involve confiden-
tiality, at least in the sense that characterizes the common law doctor-patient or lawyer-
client privileges. The newsman's privilege, it is submitted, should cover activities pro-
tected under the First Amendment-such as gathering, editing and publishing the news-
which may or may not be "confidential" in the traditional sense. There is nothing tech-
nically confidential about cutting up television tape to make a newscast or making notes
to record a public event. Yet requiring the production of outtakes and notes would un-
doubtedly have an inhibiting effect on reporters and editors, and restrict their First
Amendment rights.
There have been no decisions brought to the attention of the author requiring pro-
duction of reporters' notes. In Air Transportation Ass'n v. Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Org., 313 F. Supp. 181 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), the court did not require such pro-
duction. See Record, E.D.N.Y. Nos. 70-C-400-410, April 6, 1970, at 18-24, 36 & April
7, 1970, at 21, 38-39, 149-51 (testimony of New York Times reporter Robert Lindsay).
See also Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973); Spiva
v. Francouer, 39 Fla. Supp. 49 (Dade County Jud. Cir. 1973).
70. See, e.g., State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971), in which
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a reporter who had been told by an undis-
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such testimony, as did Lightman and Dan. While one might urge that
the courts should be more sensitive to the full scope of the issues pre-
sented to them in these cases, the approach they have -taken is not un-
like that taken in other outtake cases decided since Branzburg involving
tapes and similar matters.
Criminal Cases Involving Tapes
At the time of the Watergate trial of Gordon Liddy et al., the Los
Angeles Times published an interview with Alfred Baldwin, a Water-
gate coconspirator who had been given immunity. The interview had
been taped by a Times reporter. Upon reading the interview in the
paper, and before the trial had begun, one of the defendants subpoe-
naed the tapes in their entirety for the purpose of impeaching Baldwin's
testimony at trial.
The Times moved to quash the subpoena, arguing for a balancing
test.71 The court denied the motion but seemingly adopted the concept
of balancing. 72  It stated, however, that "[i]f the 'striking of a proper
balance' is required, as Mr. Justice Powell suggests, this Court will al-
ways strike the balance in favor of due process. '73  The court's view
closed source the names of the people responsible for bombing Sterling Hall on the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin campus must disclose that source, rejecting First Amendment argu-
ments to the contrary.
71. See United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972). The tapes had
been delivered by the reporter to the Los Angles Times Washington bureau chief
Accordingly, the Times made its motion to quash as owner of the material.
72. See id.
73. id. at 215. It may be questioned whether the court actually engaged in bal-
ancing in this case since, while the court does not say it will always strike the balance
in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, the statement seems to have that effect.
Cf. State v. Laughlin, No. 73-530 (Monroe County, Fla. Jud. Cir., July 26, 1974). In
this case, Ron Mason, a reporter for the Florida Keys Keynoter came across information
after defendants' conviction which led him to believe they had been illegally overheard
prior to their arrest on marijuana-smuggling charges. Mason informed defense counsel
of this fact, but published no articles on it. To buttress a motion for a new trial, one
of the defendants sought disclosure of Mason's source. The court, stating that it was
required to balance "the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the
individual's right to prepare his defense," denied the motion. Order Denying Motion
for New Trial at 3. The court noted that there had been no showing that the prosecu-
tion had relied upon the illegal evidence, or that the reporter's testimony would help
prove the defendant's right to a new trial. Moreover, the court said, "[I]t has not been
shown that alternate sources of the desired information have been exhausted; . . . de-
fendant has not shown . . .countervailing constitutional requirements, and absent such
a showing, to require Mason to disclose his source would amount to nothing more than
forcing the press to disclose its method of seeking out the news and its sources of in-
formation, clearly an infringement upon First Amendment freedoms," Id,
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was that the defendant's right to impeach witnesses against him by the
use of prior inconsistent statements outweighed the First Amendment
interests of the reporter in protecting his outtakes. It should be noted
that the court required production of the tapes regardless of whether
there had been any showing of relevancy, exhaustion of alternate
sources, or compelling interest.
Another case, In re Lewis,74 involved the Pacifica, California,
radio station KPFK. The station had received both a mimeographed
document purportedly issued by "The Weather Underground," which
contained information relative to the bombing of a government build-
ing, and a tape purportedly issued by "The Symbionese Liberation
Army" relating ,to the Patty Hearst kidnapping case. The station
broadcast 'the tape and .the contents of -the document, and copies of both
were made available to law enforcement agencies. However, Station
Manager Lewis refused to turn over the original tape or letter to a
grand jury which had subpoenaed them in its investigation of possible
violations of federal laws within its jurisdiction, claiming -the station's
right to protect its news sources. Citing Branzburg, the court of ap-
peals agreed that Lewis had First Amendment rights, but concluded
"that these were not violated because -there was no evidence that the
grand jury's request was for harassment of the press and not for legiti-
mate purposes of law enforcement.
75
Two similar cases, In re Foster76 and In re WBAI-FM v. Proskin,
77
also involved Pacifica radio stations. In the Foster case, a letter from
the Symbionese Liberation Army and the envelope in which it had
been sent to station KPFA were seized pursuant to a search warrant
and then bound over to a California state grand jury investigating the
death of Oakland School Superintendent Marcus Foster. The station
had broadcast 'the contents of the letter, but refused to respond to ques-
tions as to tapes and when the letter had been received. The California
Superior Court interpreted the California statute protecting sources as
shielding the station from responding to such questions.78
74. No. 74-2170 (9th Cir., July 19, 1974).
75. Id. at 7.
76. Record, In re Foster (Alameda County, Cal. Super. Ct., Mar. 28, 1974)
(transcript of hearing).
77. 42 App. Div. 2d 5 (N.Y. 1973).
78. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1973). That section states:
"§ 1070. Newsman's refusal to disclose news source.
"A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a
newspaper, or by a press association or wire service, or any person who has been so
connected or employed, cannot be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, admin-
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In the Proskin case, New York station WBAI received a letter
threatening to blow up a state building on the Albany Mall. The sta-
tion informed the police of the threat and disclosed the contents of the
letter over the air, but refused to turn over the letter itself, on the the-
ory that the handwriting could be traced to the unidentified source.
The New York court, taking a different tack than the California
tribunal, held that the state shield statute did not apply.79 The majority
did not consider the balancing test, although the dissenting opinion did.
Indiscriminate subpoenaing of tapes may well lead to indiscrimi-
nate subpoenaing of reporters' notes and outtakes, which could have
serious effects on journalism and on the First Amendment. The de-
mand for outtakes in United States v. Liddy"0 is an example of a sub-
istrative body or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas for refusing to
disclose, in any proceeding as defined in Section 901, the source of any information pro-
cured while so connected or employed for publication in a newspaper.
"Nor can a radio or television news reporter or other person connected with or em-
ployed by a radio or television station, or any person who has been so connected or
employed, be so adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose the source of any informa-
tion procured while so connected or employed for news or news commentary purposes
on radio or television."
79. In re WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 App. Div. 2d 5 (N.Y. 1973). For the text
of the New York statute, see note 65 supra. Another similar case, decided before Branz-
burg, arose after the same station had taped phone calls with inmates during an uprising
at the Tombs prison in New York City. The district attorney subpoenaed the tapes,
but the station refused to turn them over on the grounds that voiceprints would permit
identification of the prisoners whose voices had been recorded. The New York Supreme
Court held that the New York statute did not protect the tapes. The issue became moot
on appeal when the station concluded that it had never had possession of the tapes. The
court of appeals recognized the First Amendment interest involved and that balancing
might be required but declined to engage in it because of the mootness of the appeal.
People v. Goodman, 39 App. Div. 2d 869 (N.Y. 1972). See also In re Wolfe, 39 App.
Div. 2d 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1972), in which a subpoena sought the original of a
manuscript published by the Village Voice, and attributed to a Ricardo DeLeon, which
described prison life. The court held that the New York statute (note 65 supra) only
protected confidential relationships, and that in this case the source had already been
disclosed. The court noted that if balancing were applied the interest of the press was
"too remote to justify overriding the competing and compelling public interest in the fair
administration of justice." 39 App. Div. 2d at 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 301. The court
dealt with the claim that the editing process was protected by noting that the publisher
had failed to demonstrate that the article as published was different from the manuscript.
Id.; cf. In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972). Bridge, a reporter for
the Newark Evening News, had been told by a Housing Authority Commissioner that
she had been offered a bribe by a certain individual. Bridge wrote a story, but omitted
the name of the alleged briber. The court held that the New Jersey statute did not pro-
tect the reporter and rejected balancing: "We do not read the majority opinion in Branz-
burg as requiring a balancing of the interests test to determine when a reporter should
be compelled to testify. Quite to the contrary, Justice White in the [Branzburg] major-
ity opinion rejects such a contention ....... 120 N.J. Super. at 468, 295 A.2d at 6.
80. 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972).
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poena which appears to be overbroad. It is submitted that a proper
articulation of the balancing test as suggested by this -article -will lead
courts to a clearer view of the nature of the First Amendment issues
involved in these cases, so that a newsman's testimony or his production
of evidence in such situations will be required only where there is a
demonstrated need for it.
Subpoenas In Other Criminal Cases
There have been several other cases since Branzburg involving the
issuance of a subpoena to a newsman to testify in a criminal case, fre-
quently in a context where details of the crime have been published
before the trial has begun.8 ' Two such decisions are State v. St. Peter"2
and Brown v. Commonwealth. 3 Both cases involved stories covering
alleged criminal acts which were later the subjects of indictments, and
both courts adopted a qualified privilege.
In -the St. Peter case, a reporter for a Burlington television station,
John Gladding, had been informed in advance of a drug raid by the
state police. He covered -the raid and reported on it over the air. An
indictment was handed down and, as part of the pretrial discovery per-
mitted under Vermont procedure, Gladding was asked who had told
him about the drug raid, and what he had seen during it. He testified
as to what he had seen, since he had already 'broadcast an account of
that, but refused to disclose his source.
When the defendants pressed for an answer, the trial court re-
quired that Gladding respond to -the question upon penalty of contempt.
Gladding refused, and the matter was referred to the Supreme Court
of Vermont with the approval of the lower court before it had rendered
a final judgment.8 4 The appellate tribunal held that Branzburg re-
quired a balancing test,85 and -that 'the questions posed did not meet
that -test. The court concluded:
[W]e hold -that, when a newsgatherer, legitimately entitled to
First Amendment protection, objects to inquiries put to him in a
deposition proceeding conducted in a criminal case, on the grounds
of a First Amendment privilege, he is entitled to refuse to answer
unless the interrogator can demonstrate to the judicial officer ap-
81. This was also the fact pattern in Liddy, since the defendant subpoenaed the
tapes under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure section 17(a) for the purpose of prepar-
ing for cross-examination.
82. 315 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1974) (certified question).
83. 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974).
84. 315 A.2d at 254-55.
85. Id. at 255.
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pealed to that there is no other adequately available source for the
information and that it is relevant and material on the issue of guilt
or innocence. If such a showing cannot be made to a measure con-
sistent with the overriding of any First Amendment concern, the
deponent cannot properly be compelled to answer the question.86
Thus, while the Vermont court adopts the balancing -test, it deals
only with the relevancy of the information sought and the unavailability
of alternate sources; it does not deal with compelling national interest
as such.
In the Brown case, -the Supreme Court of Virginia explicitly fol-
lowed the St. Peter decision. A reporter for the Free Lance Star, a
newspaper in Stafford County, Virginia, had written a story on a local
murder. Her account quoted a source in the sheriff's office to the ef-
fect that a witness and the victim had surprised two men prowling in
a junkyard at night, whereupon "[t]he unknown men said 'Hey', in a
friendly manner and then fired two shots, one of which struck [the vic-
tim].""7 At the trial, the prosecution witness testified substantially as the
the story reported, but stated that the victim had said "Hey," not the
defendant.
The defendant then subpoenaed the reporter to testify. Much as
Gladding had, she authenticated the account but refused to disclose her
source. The trial court upheld her refusal, and the Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed. Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Poff cited
Branzburg as authority in holding:
[A] newsman's privilege of confidentiality of information and iden-
tity of his source is an important catalyst to the free flow of infor-
mation guaranteed by the freedom of press clause of the First
Amendment. Unknown at common law, it is a privilege related
to the First Amendment and not a First Amendment right, abso-
lute, universal, and paramount to all other rights.88
He then went on to say:
We are of the opinion that when there are reasonable grounds -to
believe that information in the possession of a newsman is material
to proof of any element of a criminal offense, or to proof of the
defense asserted by the defendant, or to a reduction in the classifi-
cation or gradation of the offense charged, or to a mitigation of the
penalty attached, the defendant's need to acquire such information
is essential to a fair trial; when such information is not otherwise
available, the defendant has a due process right to compel disclo-
sure of such information and the identity of the source; and any
86. Id. at 256.
87. 204 S.E.2d at 430.
88. Id. at431.
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privilege of confidentiality claimed by the newsman must, upon
pain of contempt, yield to that right.89
The court noted the defendant's desire to obtain the subpoenaed
information in order -to exercise his right to cross-examine the prosecut-
ing witness on the inconsistent statements. Observing that a defendant
generally has such a right, the court went on to explain that "under
the rule we adopt, when such a right collides with the newsman's priv-
ilege of confidentiality, the privilege prevails unless the inconsistent
statements are material within -the definition of the rule."90  The court
distinguished the Liddy case by implying that denial of due process was
involved there, but not in the case at bar.91  In short, the Virginia Court
followed the Vermont Court in adopting the rule that unless there is
a showing that the material is relevant and that alternate sources are
not available, no disclosure should be required.
In another case involving pretrial publicity, United States v.
Calvert,92 a grand jury was investigating mail -fraud, and a local CBS
newscast in St. Louis predicted the return of an indictment. The po-
tential defendants in the case subpoenaed the reporter for the source
of the statements in the newscast. The station delivered a transcript
of the broadcast, but refused to disclose the source. The reporter ar-
gued that he had a constitutional privilege, granted by Branzburg, not
to reveal it. He pointed out that the defendants were seeking to elim-
inate pretrial prejudice on the part of the grand jury, a situation not
covered by Branzburg. The court granted -the reporter's motion to
quash the subpoena without opinion.
It may be that St. Peter, Brown, Liddy and Calvert are all "fair
trial-free press" cases. 3 All four involved pretrial publicity, 'that is,
89. Id. (citation omitted).
90. Id.
91. "Nor are society's demands that the privilege yield to the legitimate needs of
law enforcement superior to the demands of due process that the privilege yield to the
legitimate needs of the accused to defend himself. See United States v. Liddy [citation
omitted]." Id. It appears doubtful that the cases are different, and a cross-examination
seems equally relevant and important in each.
92. No. 74-107 (E.D. Mo. April 26, 1974).
93. "Fair trial-free press" is the shorthand term used to denote the conflict be-
tween the right of the defendant to an impartial trial and the right of the press to report
criminal proceedings. The issue frequently arises in pretrial publicity cases. See ADvi-
SORY COMMT EE ON FAiR TRIAL AND FREE PREss, AMmlcAN BAR AssocrrIoN, FAIR
TRIAL AND FREE PREss (Approved draft, 1968) (Reardon Report); SPECIAL CoMMrIrEE
ON RADIO, TELEvISION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, AssocIATIoN OF THE BAR
OF THE CrrY OF NEw YORK, FREEDOM OF THE PREss AND FAIR TIAL (Final report,
1967) (Medina Report); Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, Judicial Con-
ference of the United States, The Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury
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statements made to the press concerning criminal investigations, crim-
inal behavior later resulting in prosecution, or pending criminal trials.
Although the courts involved did not address themselves to the point,
it can be argued that if every pretrial story is to be the subject of a
subpoena, pretrial reporting will dry up. Some courts might feel more
comfortable in such an atmosphere, but the history of American juris-
prudence-as distinct from the British or common law experience 9 -
is to the contrary.
To date, the most noted fair trial-free press case involving subpoe-
nas is Farr v. Superior Court.95 Farr, a reporter for the Los Angeles
Times, had independently obtained a statement about one of the de-
fendants in the Manson murder case. He confirmed the statement by
talking to two of the defense lawyers, whom 'he promised confidential-
ity. The jury was sequestered and Farr printed his story.
Following the trial, the trial judge required Farr to disclose his
source. Upon his refusal, which occurred before the date of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Branzburg, Farr was held in contempt.96
This ruling was upheld by the California Court of Appeal. The Su-
preme Court of California denied Farr's petition for a hearing, and the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.97  He thereupon
brought habeas corpus proceedings in the federal district court without
success.
98
Pending an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
from the district court's denial of habeas corpus, Farr was released from
jail by Justice Douglas, who stated that:
System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1969) (Kaufman Report).
See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367
(1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941). Also relevant on this point are the motion papers filed October 10, 1973,
in In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, Civil No. 73-965
(D. Md. 1973), especially the memorandum of law in support of a motion by Nicholas
Gage, an investigative reporter for The New York Times, seeking to quash a subpoena
issued on behalf of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew for the purpose of investigating grand
jury leaks. The court never ruled on the matter, since the grand jury proceedings were
terminated upon Agnew's nolo contendere plea.
94. Under British law, prior restraints on pretrial publications are permitted. See,
e.g., Cowen, The Law: British and American, in FAIR TRIAL V. A FRE PREss 9 (1965)
(an Occasional Paper on the Free Society for the Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions).
95. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971).
96. Id. at 63, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
97. See id.
98. See In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974); Farr v.
Pitchess, 409 U.S. 1243, 1244 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1973).
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[o]ur Branzburg decision plainly does not cover [this case].
The question, so far as I can tell, is not covered by any of
our prior decisions. The case is a recurring one where the interests
of a fair trial sometimes collide with the requirements of a free
press.
99
Following Douglas's decision, the California Court of Appeal de-
nied Farr's state petition for habeas corpus, but ordered a hearing to
determine whether "disobedience of the order is based upon an estab-
lished articulated moral principle."'10  After such a hearing, Los
Angeles County Superior Court Judge William H. Levit released Farr,
holding that since there was no substantial likelihood that Farr would
comply with the court's order to disclose his sources, 1' 1 there was no
reason to continue to hold him in contempt.
For two reasons, the Farr case appears -to have been decided 'upon
incorrect grounds. First, it seems to indicate a misunderstanding by
the trial and appellate judges of rulings in the fair trial-free press area,
and particularly of the ruling in Sheppard v. Maxwell.0 2 That case
is quite clear in its holding that the court can impose restrictions on
the release of information to the press only upon those within its juris-
diction, namely, officers of the court.'03 There is no authority in the
decision for direct restraints by the court on the press. Three studies
dealing with the fair trial-free press dilemma-the Reardon, Kaufman,
and Medina Reportsll 4-appear to recognize this, as we have many cases
decided on fair trial-free press guidelines, including the recent decision
by Justice Powell in Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schuling-
kamp.1
0 5
99o Farr v. Pitchess, 409 U.S. 1243, 1245-46 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1973).
100. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 584, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649, 653 (1974).
101. "By reason of his commitment to the principle of confidentiality and to the
promises he has made, there is no substantial likelihood that further incarceration of"
Farr will result in his compliance with the court's order to reveal the identities of his
sources or otherwise serve the purposes of said order." In re Farr, No. A 253 1561
(Los Angeles County, Cal. Super. Ct., June 20, 1974).
102. 384U.S. 333 (1966).
103. See id. at 363.
104. See note 93 supra.
105. 43 U.S.L.W. 2046 (U.S. July 29, 1974). A state court conducting a murder
trial had entered an order directing the press to avoid interviewing witnesses, publishing
the defendants' prior criminal records or possible confessions, reporting testimony
stricken by the court, publishing leaks, and making editorial comments. Justice Powell
stayed the order saying, "On the record before me, and certainly in the absence of any
showing of an imminent threat to fair trial, I cannot say that the order of the state court
would withstand the limitations that this Court has applied in determining the propriety
of prior restraints on publication." Id. But see United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d
496 (5th Cir. 1972). In Dickinson, the New Orleans District Court entered an order
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If, as this article maintains, Branzburg requires courts to apply a
balancing test, then Farr would also appear to be incorrectly decided
because no consideration whatsoever was given 'to such a test. Even
if only a test of compelling state interest is to be applied, it is very dif-
ficult to perceive what the state interest in the disclosure was once the
trial was over--especially since the jury was sequestered when the story
was printed.
Fair trial-free press issues when litigated are very difficult ones
for -the press, since courts are often being asked, in effect, to rule
against their own self-interest. While the demands made by the press
on the process of fair trial administration are admittedly burdensome,
it does not seem that ,the appropriate method of accommodation is to
force disclosure of sources by newsmen. 1°6
Civil Cases
Many of the civil cases since Branzburg involving subpoenas
to newsmen have been libel actions. But there have been at least three
enjoining publication of accounts of a pretrial hearing. Several local reporters disobeyed
the ban. The order was held unconstitutional, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that disobedience to it, until its reversal, was nonetheless contumacious and re-
manded the case for a determination of whether the judgment would still be appropriate
even though the order was unconstitutional. See id. at 513-14. But cf. State v. Sperry,
79 Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608 (1971).
106. See also the two cases involving reporter Lucy Ware Morgan, State v. Morgan,
Civil No. 73-741 (Pasco County Cir. 1973) at the trial level. The Morgan cases are
another recent example of a subpoena being issued to a reporter in a fair trial-free press
context. In these cases, a reporter for a regional newspaper published by the St. Peters-
burg Times reported that a grand jury had assailed "Dade City" in its presentment to
the local judge. The presentment had not been released to the public, and the local dis-
trict attorney, under a district attorney's subpoena, asked reporter Morgan to state the
source of her information. She refused and was held in contempt. Order of Contempt,
State v. Morgan, Civil No. 73-741 (Pasco County, Fla. Jud. Cir. Nov. 2, 1973) (Lucy
Morgan I). Subsequently, she refused to divulge her sources before a grand jury. She
was adjudged in contempt a second time. Order of Contempt, State v. Morgan, Civil
No. 73-741 (Pasco County, Fla. Jud. Cir. Mar. 29, 1974) (Lucy Morgan II). Whether
or not Morgan technically is a fair trial case, in view of the fact that there may never
be a trial (since the jury refused to indict), it is similar to many of the fair trial cases,
especially Calvert. The Morgan court apparently did not apply a balancing test, but
decided the case as a matter of state law. In its brief, the state relied on Clein v. State,
52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950). Clein involved a newspaper publisher who was convicted
for refusing to tell a grand jury where he had gotten his information on previous grand
jury testimony. On appeal, the conviction of Clein was upheld. In Lucy Morgan 1,
involving the state attorney's subpoena, an appeal is pending. Civil No. 73-931 (2d
Dist. Fla. Ct. App. 1974). Lucy Morgan II, which involved the refusal to answer
the same questions before a grand jury, is under appeal. Civil No. 74-619 (2d Dist.
Fla. Ct. App. 1974).
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cases in which newsmen have been subpoenaed to testify as witnesses in
general civil litigation.
Of particular significance is Democratic National Committee v.
McCord, 107 an action brought by the Democratic Party for damages re-
sulting from the Watergate break-in. A subpoena sought documents,
papers, letters, photographs, audio and video tapes, manuscripts, notes,
tape recordings, drafts, and copies of news materials relating to the
Watergate break-in from The New York Times, The Washington Post,
The Washington Star-News, and Time Magazine. The New York
Times, as owner of the work product of its reporter, part of the material
subpoenaed, intervened on behalf of its reporter, John Crewdson.
10 8
The district court quashed the subpoena, stating that "The Unique
Circumstances and Great Public Importance of These Cases Compel
a Finding by the Court That Movants Are Entitled to At Least a Quali-
fied Privilege Under the First Amendment . . . ."I" The court ex-
pressly required that (1) alternate sources be exhausted, and (2) a
showing of materiality be made. It said:
[T]here has been no showing by the parties that alternative
sources of evidence have been exhausted or even approached as
to the possible gleaning of facts alternatively available from the
Movants herein. Nor has there been any positive showing of the
materiality of the documents and other materials sought by the sub-
poenas. 10
The court noted that the Republican Party was seeking to sub-
poena sources of information relating -to the Watergate scandal. To al-
low enforcement of the subpoena, the court said, might well inhibit re-
porting about the very party seeking to enforce the subpoena. There
was no compelling state interest in moving the litigation forward at that
particular time by producing the evidence requested. Indeed, the
court concluded that the state interest involved would be best served
by quashing the subpoena so that investigative reporting about Water-
gate could continue."'
107. 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
108. The New York Times had similarly intervened as owner of the work product
of its reporter in the district court proceedings in Caldwell. In permitting intervention,
that court stated: "The New York Times Company has such an interest in the work
product of Mr. Caldwell and the knowledge he has acquired in the course of his em-
ployment as a full-time reporter for it." Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 359-
60 (N.D. Cal. 1970). In McCord, the court permitted the intervention without com-
ment. Cf. United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972).
109. 356 F. Supp. at 1396.
110. Id. at 1398.
i1 , 'Ths Coxirt cannot bind ti -Wf to the possible 'chilling effect' the enforcement
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McCord was followed in Spiva v. Francouer,"1 2 decided by a
Florida state court. A subpoena duces tecum was served on the Miami
News requesting all the 'background material, notes, and memoranda
concerning an editorial the News had written which had attacked the
defendants in a civil trial. The court cited McCord in quashing the
subpoena, stating:
[T]he court is convinced that if the Miami News is required
to attend the taking of its deposition, to answer questions about its
sources, and to produce any or all of the information set forth in
the subpoena duces tecum, that would have a chilling effect upon
freedom of the press and would tend to "dry up" the sources of
information which are available in a free society. 113
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued
a similar ruling in Baker v. F & F Investment,"' holding that Alfred
Balk, then a freelance writer for the Saturday Evening Post, did not
have to disclose the source of an article he had written describing block-
busting in Chicago. An action charging racial discrimination in housing
violating federal and state laws as well as the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments had been filed," 5 and Balk had been subpoenaed
to disclose his source for the article. The court concluded (incorrectly,
I think) that Branzburg did not recognize an absolute or conditional
testimonial privilege for journalists." 6 Despite this conclusion, it ap-
proved the district court's finding below "that there were other available
sources of information . . . which appellants had not exhausted." 17
of these broad subpoenas would have on the flow of information to the press, and so
to the public. This Court stands convinced that if it allows the discouragement of inves-
tigative reporting into the highest levels of government no amount of legal theorizing
could allay the public suspicions engendered by its action and by the matter alleged in
these lawsuits." Id. at 1397.
112. 39 Fla. Supp. 49 (Dade County Jud. Cir. 1973).
113. Id. at 51.
114. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
115. See Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (1969).
116. See Baker v. F. & F. Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1972). In con-
sidering Branzburg, the Baker court limited the holding in that case to a decision that a
newsman-witness was obliged to give relevant testimony to a grand jury conducting a
criminal investigation. It pointed out that all the Supreme Court had done in Branzburg
was to apply the compelling state interest test in a situation where "the state had met its
burden." "The Court in Branzburg, as the Court of Appeals had done in Garland, ap-
plied traditional First Amendment doctrine, which teaches that constitutional rights se-
cured by the First Amendment cannot be infringed absent a 'compelling' or 'paramount'
state interest . . . and found such an overriding interest in the investigation of crime
by the grand jury .... ." Id. at 784. The court noted Powell's separate concurring
opinion in Branzburg, which urges a balance of interests test on a case by case basis.
117. Id. at 783.
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The district court had held "that disclosure by Balk of his source was
not essential to protect the public interest in the orderly administration
of justice in the courts. The [information sought] simply did not go
to the heart of appellants' case ....
In short, the court of appeals agreed with the district court that
(1) the plaintiff had not exhausted alternate sources, (2) he had made
no showing of relevance, and (3) his claim did not go to the heart of
the matter. Hence, there was no state interest in forcing disclosure.
As phrased by Judge Kaufman:
While we recognize that there are cases-few in number to 'be
sure-where First Amendment rights must yield, we are still mind-
ful of the preferred position which the First Amendment occupies
in the pantheon of freedoms. Accordingly, though a journalist's
right to protect confidential sources may not take precedence over
that rare overriding and compelling interest, we are of the view that
there are circumstances, at the very least in civil cases, in which
the public interest in non-disclosure of a journalist's confidential
sources outweighs the public and private interest in compelled testi-
mony.119
Libel Cases
At least four libel cases dealing with subpoenas of newsmen have
been decided since Branzburg, and all but one have applied a qualified
privilege to the production of testimony. These cases must be dis-
cussed in the context of the 1958 decision in Garland v. Torre,120 an
opinion written by then Circuit Judge Potter Stewart, sitting by designa-
tion in the Second Circuit. Most courts deciding libel cases since
Branzburg have looked to this case, as well as to Branzburg, as a source
of authority.
In the Garland case, actress Judy Garland had been described by
Marie Torre in her Herald Tribune column as overweight. The state-
ment was attributed to unnamed CBS executives. Garland sued CBS,
and sought the identity of the people who had made -the statements.
After having deposed other possible sources of information and having
found nothing useful, Garland sought to depose defendant Torre. The
latter refused to disclose her source. The court, speaking through
Judge Stewart, writing for the majority, required that she do so. The
test applied by the court in Garland is very similar -to ,the one Justice
Stewart later articulated in his Branzburg dissent. The Garland test
118. Id. (citation omitted).
119. Id. at 783.
120. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
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demands: (1) relevancy, (2) exhaustion of alternate sources, and (3)
that the question asked go to the heart of the matter."'
As to the first point, Stewart's opinion in Garland specifically re-
quired that the question be of more than "doubtful relevance."' 12 2 As
to the second, Stewart pointed out that Garland had exhausted alternate
sources, and that if the source of the story were not disclosed, Garland
would be unable to pursue her action.' 2 3  Finally, he ruled, the ques-
tion must go to the heart of the matter.'2 4  The testimony must bear
directly on the major thrust of the plaintiffs claim. Otherwise, there
will be no compelling state interest in using legal process to force the
testimony.
2 5
In Buchanan v. Cronkite,'26 Henry Buchanan, the brother of
White House speechwriter Pat Buchanan, brought a libel action against
CBS for broadcasting that he had used his accounting firm to "launder"
money from the Committee to Re-Elect the President. The statement
had turned out to be erroneous, and CBS had broadcast a correction.
During the course of pretrial proceedings, Buchanan sought testimony
from Herbert Lewis, the author of an article in the Columbia Journal-
ism Review on coverage of Watergate by the electronic and print press.
The article reported the background of the broadcast, and that CBS had
run the correction, but it did not give the source of Lewis's information.
The article did note, however, that CBS had declined to comment.
Lewis was deposed and answered all questions except as to sources.
The plaintiff moved to require Lewis to disclose his CBS sources
and the substance of his interview with a CBS newswoman, but the
court denied the motion, noting that (a) no showing of relevance had
been made, 2 7 (b) CBS personnel had declined to comment on the
broadcast, and hence it was likely Lewis received no information since,
if received, it would have been pertinent to his article, 2 8 and (c) no
121. See id. at 549, 551.
122. Id. at 549-50.
123. Id. at 551.
124. Id. at 550.
125. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 n.33 (1972) (Stewart, Brennan
& Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
126. Civil No. 1087-73 (D.D.C. 1974).
127. Order Denying Motion to Compel Answer at 3, Buchanan v. Cronkite, Civil
No. 1087-73 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 1973) (order filed July 18, 1974). "These assertions
by plaintiffs . . .are mere speculation, far short of the degree of relevance necessary
to overcome a newsman's qualified privilege to protect the confidentiality of his sources."
Id.
128. Id. at 1.
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attempt to exhaust alternate sources had been made.' 29
On the other hand, in Carey v. Hume 30 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia required disclosure of a source. Jack
Anderson had written a column stating that United Mine Workers
general counsel Edward L. Carey and UMW President Tony Boyle had
been seen improperly taking records from Boyle's office. Carey sued
for libel and deposed Britt Hume, Anderson's colleague, who had sup-
plied information for the article. Hume stated that a UMW employee
was the source for the statement but declined to identify him.
The court of appeals first noted that Branzburg had not "disturb[ed]
the basic balancing approach set forth in Garland.'131  Insofar as civil
litigation was concerned, the method remained one of "look[ing] to
the facts on a case-by-case basis in the course of weighing the need
for the testimony in question against the claim of the newsman that the




The court in Carey went on to find that the information sought
went to 'the heart of the matter: "the identity of the appellant's sources
is critical to appellee's claim."'31 3  While the plaintiff had made no ef-
fort to discover -the source of Hume's statement, the court noted that-
in contrast to Baker v. F & F Investment' 34-it was unreasonable to
have the plaintiff interview all employees of the UMW to discover the
source of Hume's statement.
13 5
The Carey court also distinguished Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 36 in
129. "A party should seek a newsman's sources only as a last resort." Id. at 3.
130. 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
131. Id. at 636. "[1It appears to us that Branzburg, in language if not in holding,
left intact, insofar as civil litigation is concerned, the approach taken in Garlan&" Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 637.
134. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
135. 492 F.2d at 638-39. However, it can reasonably be argued that it would have
been equally burdensome for the plaintiff in Baker to interview every real estate agent
in Chicago in order to determine Balk's source. See notes 114-19 & accompanying text
supra.
136. 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972). Life Magazine had published an article about
the Mayor of St. Louis entitled "The Mayor, The Mob and The Lawyer." Mayor Cer-
vantes sued Life for libel. The pretrial depositions in the case showed that Life had
been very careful in preparing the article, with one researcher, four editors and three
lawyers spending a great deal of time corroborating the material which the article's chief
reporter had collected. See id. at 994. Cervantes sought to depose that reporter to dis-
cover his sources. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not
necessary to disclose the sources in view of the plaintiff's burden of proof of actual
malice as set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 'U.S. 254 (1964). See note
1 7 infra, The court granted the miotiog,
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which the Eighth Circuit had affirmed the grant of a summary judgment
for a libel defendant, and had refused to force disclosure of his sources.
In view of the plaintiff's burden under New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,1 7 the Cervantes court found that there was no reasonable
probability that plaintiff would succeed in his libel suit. The court
stated that "to compel a newsman to breach a confidential relationship
merely because a libel suit has been filed against him would seem in-
evitably to lead to an excessive restraint on -the scope of legitimate
newsgathering activity."' 38  In short, Cervantes holds that there must
be a substantial state interest present before the court will require the
disclosure of a newsman's source. If there is no probability of the
plaintiff's success in the action, no disclosure is required. In disposing
of Cervantes, the Carey court noted that it was not "unlikely" that
Carey would succeed in his libel case.'39
While all of the foregoing libel cases explicitly or implicitly
adopted the qualified privilege for newsmen, one such case-Dow
Jones & Co. v. Superior Court'40-most assuredly does not. The Wall
Street Journal had reported that a local real-estate developer had a bad
reputation in Stoneham, Massachusetts, because he wanted to build
apartment houses in an area zoned residential. It turned out that the
developer actually wanted to build a nursing home, and the Journal cor-
rected the article. The builder sued and the paper refused to reveal
its source.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the argu-
ments advanced for a qualified privilege and concluded, "The obliga-
tion of newsmen, we think, is that of every citizen, viz. to appear when
summoned, with relevant written or other material when required, and
to answer relevant and reasonable inquiries."'' The court did not re-
quire exhaustion of alternate sources, or a compelling interest in the
137. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and the cases follow-
ing it, require that as a prerequisite to recovery in libel actions public-figure plaintiffs
demonstrate that the statements complained of were made with actual malice, that is,
knowing them to be false or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
138. 464 F.2d at 993 n.10. See also Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071
(N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 449 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that there
should be no disclosure of sources because of the improbability of success under New
York Times). The rule in Cervantes is designed to prevent the initiation of libel suits
merely for the purpose of requiring disclosure of sources. Cf. Application of Cepeda,
233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), requiring disclosure of sources because alternate
sources had been exhausted.
139. 492 F.2d at 638.
140. 1973 Mass. Adv. Sheets 1469, 303 N.E.2d 847 (1973).
141. Id., 303 N.E.2d at 849.
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reporter's testimony. It relied on its earlier decision in In re Pappas
142
as authority for the view that there was no First Amendment interest
involved in requiring disclosure of sources.
14 3
Apart from the Dow Jones case, however, the newsman's privilege
in civil libel cases seems to be developing on the familiar basis of (1)
relevancy, (2) exhaustion of alternate sources, and (3) a compelling
interest in the testimony, that is, that it goes to the heart of the matter
(Garland, Carey, Buchanan) and is not for the purpose of forcing dis-
closure of sources (Cervantes).144
Conclusions
It seems clear that five of the nine justices in Branzburg would
not require a reporter's testimony in every instance; thus they granted
a "qualified newsman's privilege." The standard varies from Justice
Powell's apparent minimal requirement to the absolute position ex-
pressed by Justice Douglas,
Articulation of a qualified newsman's privilege is a very difficult
task. As of mid-1974, Congress had not passed a shield bill, because,
inter alia, of the complexity of expressing exactly what the nature
of the privilege should be. Since Branzburg was handed down, some
of the courts have also wrestled with this question; others have avoided
the issue, concluding-incorrectly, in my view-that a qualified news-
man's privilege does not exist.
142. In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971).
143. See 1973 Mass. Adv. Sheets 1469, 303 N.E.2d at 849. "[We are asked to
rule that journalists have a qualified privilege to refuse to reveal confidential information
which is admittedly relevant to a court proceeding. We adhere to our prior holding that
the First Amendment imports no such privilege, qualified or absolute." Id.
144. See also Linsey v. Kelman, Civil No. 15,396 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 1973). A
Wallingford, Connecticut, paper stated that a dog track developer who wished to build
a track in Wallingford consorted with criminals. The article also quoted a Brandeis
University official as saying that the developer was "both a benefactor and scoundrel
'.. " The story went on to quote a Jewish Philanthropies executive as saying: "We
have a way of dry cleaning Joe Linsey's money." See N.Y. Times, March 21, 1972,
at 19, col. 1. The developer sued for libel and moved for disclosure of the sources of
the two statements. The court denied the motion without opinion, citing Baker and Cer-
vantes. See Motion for Order Compelling Discovery, denied Mar. 9, 1973. Several
analogous cases were decided before Branzburg. See SEC v. North American Research
& Dev. Corp., 67 Civ. 3724 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1968) (unreported case in which a
special master found that The New York Times columnist Robert Metz need not disclose
the source of a story about the North American Research company since the testimony
was not relevant and did "not go to the heart of the case").--Special Masters Report at
7 (June 4, 1968). See also Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F, Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
But cf. Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957).
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The four Branzburg dissenters would protect a newsman unless
there was a showing of (1) relevance, (2) exhaustion of alternate
sources, and (3) compelling state interest. We know that Justice
Powell would adopt the first test, and this article has suggested that the
process of balancing individual rights under the First Amendment with
the state's interest in testimony invariably results in an articulation sim-
ilar to parts 2 and 3 of the dissenters' test. It is submitted -that there
is nothing in Justice Powell's opinion that is inconsistent with the minor-
ity view, except -that he would apparently shift the burden of proof to
the newsman.
An examination of the surprising number of cases decided in the
two-year period since Branzburg provides an insight into the practica-
bility and viability of a qualified newsman's privilege. Although count-
ing noses is not persuasive, a majority recognize a qualified privilege-
correctly, in my view. In the cases adopting a qualified privilege, ref-
erence is usually made to all or part of the three-part test suggested
by the minority in Branzburg. It can be said that, as a rule, when it
comes to witnessing a crime, the courts have required testimony of
newsmen without contemplating at great length the relevance Justice
Powell would require, or the notion that the newsman should be a last
resort for -testimony. The courts seem to rely on an a priori compelling
need of the state to require such testimony.
The cases have also generally treated tapes containing evidence
of criminal behavior in the same fashion. While one can appreciate
the obvious state interest in obtaining from a tape details of a crime,
wholesale subpoenas of newsmen's tapes will inevitably impinge upon
the editing process, particularly as this is reflected in the electronic
newsman's outtakes and the print reporter's notes.
The remaining criminal cases involving subpoenas to newsmen
seem to arise in situations where defendants, or courts on their behalf,
are seeking information from the press to protect defendants' rights at
trial. In several instances the cases have involved pretrial publicity. In
many cases, the courts have protected such information (although Farr
is a notable exception). This has been the result of the application
of a balancing test roughly comparable to Justice Stewart's. It is sub-
mitted that this determination is the correct one, since investigative re-
porting frequently depends on the ability of a reporter to obtain infor-
mation before or during trials, and-as the Watergate cases prove-
often after trials have been finished and apparently closed.
Many of the civil cases decided since Branzburg deal with libel,
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Substantially all of them adopt 'the test suggested 'by Justice Stewart in
Garland v. Torre, a test which is roughly comparable to ,the one he sug-
gested in his Branzburg dissent. The cases cannot all be rationalized;
indeed, it would be foolish to try to do so. But they do seem to be
developing a qualified newsman's privilege similar 'to the one newsmen
themselves proposed to -the Supreme Court in Branzburg, a test sub-
stantially adopted by Stewart in his dissent. While Justice Powell de-
clined to adopt this test, analysis indicates that his position is not far
from Stewart's.
Perhaps we will know more when the Supreme Court 'hears an-
other newsman's privilege case. When it does, the Court will be able
to refer to a body of case law-large already, -and no doubt larger
then-which hopefully will provide a foundation of reasoning upon
which the Supreme Court can rely in articulating with clarity a qualified
newsman's privilege.

